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Article 8: Investment Securities*
By EDWIN W. BRIGGS**
INTRODUCTION
Many years ago a famous legal scholar assured us that "at the present
as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal development lies
not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in so-
ciety itself. This sentence, perhaps, contains the substance of every attempt
to state the fundamental principles of the sociology of law."1 Moreover,
he insisted that "the statement that the whole law is not contained in the
legal propositions [i.e., law propounded by courts and legislatures] applies
to a much greater degree to the law that is in force today than to the law
of the past."' Perhaps no piece of massive legislative drafting more per-
suasively testifies to the increasing recognition of these facts asserted by
Ehrlich, than does the monumental draft Code known popularly as the Uni-
form Commercial Code. And among its nine articles, dealing with a great
variety of commercial subjects, possibly article 8, entitled "Investment
Securities," illustrates more dramatically than any of the others the proposi-
tions he asserts.'
As numerous writers have stated,' article 8 is neither a blue-sky law,
nor a corporation code, so it does not purport to replace either the statutes
regulating the creation, management, and operation of corporations, nor
*Among article 8's many points of interest two are particularly significant, both
because of the understanding of the Code which their recognition helps to give
and because of their larger implications when considered as part of the doctrine
of the modern "science of law." One point involves a recognition of the extent to
which this Code has .been adapted to already existing commercial practices, which
the accompanying modification of general or traditional legal doctrine, which it
was found necessary to make in order to achieve that correspondence between
"practice" and "theory." The second point of special interest and significance is
found in the very considerable modification of "orthodox doctrines" regulating
negotiability when applied to the broad field of "investment securities." These
two factors are the components of what is often called a "functional treatment"
rather than a "conceptual" one. The following analysis is made so as to "point
up" these two important factors, in the belief that such analysis is most likely to
provide the greatest amount of real understanding of its more enduring implica-
tions.
**Professor of Law, Montana State University. B.S. 1927, Oklahoma A. & M. Col-
lege; LL.B. 1932, University of Oklahoma; LL.M. 1935, Harvard University.
'Foreword to EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW at wv
(Moll Transl. 1936). Two very fine studies based on an Institutional analysis, and
recognizing the discrepancy between the proper "rules for the inner order" of those
institutions and the "legal propositions" offered by traditional doctrine, are found
in the following two articles: Douglas and Bates, Stock "Brokers" as Agents and
Dealers, 43 YAIT L.J. 46 (1933) ; and Taylor, Trading in Commodity Futures-A
New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63 (1933).
'Id. at 487.
'Adapted to the legislative process, Ehrlich's propositions may be currently stated
as follows: Legislatures must do the best job possible of recognizing and giving
formal expression In statutory law to desirable business practices which have
grown up in spite of outmoded legal doctrines and rules, on the one hand, and
of modifying other existing rules insofar as they make impossible the development
of desirable business practices and the recognition of important social interests.
'See e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-101, comment (hereinafter cited UCC):
CONNECTICUT TEMPORARY COMMISSION, STUDY AND REPORT UPON THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 44 (1959) (hereinafter cited CONN. TEMP. COMM., STUDY AND RE-
PORT).
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those regulating the issuing of securities. Rather, it focuses its attention on
the share certificate itself, as a "chattel" or commodity bought and sold
on the open market, in response to a long felt need in the commercial and
investment world to give as full effect as possible to the economic fact that
a very large part of our wealth today is represented in corporate securities.
The operation and practices of the modern exchange and investment mar-
kets where these instruments are bought and sold make it almost impera-
tive that these securities be treated as nearly completely negotiable as is
possible, in spite of the fact that the special character of economic wealth
which they represent has seemed to make the ideal of complete negotiability
difficult, if not impossible.
Another badly needed change in the law regulating investment secur-
ities concerns the independent though closely related process of registering
transfers of ownership, and the duties imposed upon the issuer to guard
against "wrongful transfers." The liabilities imposed on the issuer for
registering such transfers have become so onerous, that a resultant practice
of demanding a mass of documentation supporting the regularity of the
transfer has created a serious "clog" in the operations of the entire secur-
ities market.
Hence, the two major subjects dealt with in article 8 are: 1. Negoti-
ability-making such instruments fully negotiable to protect good faith pur-
chasers for value thereof; and 2. Registration of title transfer-lessening
the prime responsibility of the issuer or its agent for checking against
"fraudulent transfers" and simplifying the procedures for satisfying the
responsibilities which it continues to have.
The draft of the Code analyzed below is that contained in the 1958 Of-
ficial Text, which includes both the very extensive revisions of the original
1952 draft made in 1957,' and the further substantial revisions of portions
of parts 3 and 4 of article 8, approved in 1958.' Almost certainly article 8
was more extensively revised as a result of the intensive studies and hear-
ings carried on by the Law Revision Commission of the State of New York
in 1954, 1955, and 1956, than any other article in the Code. Without ques-
tion, these revisions greatly improved the quality of that article.
General Arrangement
Article 8 is composed of four parts. Part 1 deals with certain general
and preliminary matters, and is entitled "Short Title and General Mat-
ters." Part 2 is concerned with the status of the "issuer" of investment
securities, the issuing process, including restrictions and limitations, and
the relationship of the issuer to the various persons who may acquire rights
in an "issue." So its subject is "Issue-Issuer." Part 3 is entitled "Pur-
chase" and implements the prime object of article 8 by attributing full
negotiability to "investment securities" as defined therein and by setting
5The 1957 official text, approved in that year by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was based on
the 1956 recommendations made by the editorial board for the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Article 8 was approved as recommended, with little if any further
changes.
eThe 1958 changes were first presented in U.L.A., 1958 SVFPFL3M4T TO UNIFORM
CoMERmCIAL CODE (1958).
19591
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forth the various specialized rules necessary to achieve such "negotiability"
in instruments of this particular character. Dealing with the subject of
''registration" of such securities, part 4 seeks to simplify and expedite the
procedure for registering the transfer of property interests in investment
securities in registered form by lessening substantially the responsibility of
the "issuer" to determine either the "rightfulness" or the "legality" of
such transfer. To the extent that it suceeds, it not only serves a critically
felt need in the securities market concerning the transfer process,' but it
promotes tremendously the object of vesting investment securities with ef-
fective negotiability, with the commercial advantages supposed to accrue
therefrom.
PART I
Definitions for the purposes of article 8 are set forth in section 8-101.
One of the first substantial modifications of traditional thinking and exist-
ing law found in this article is in the strictly "functional" (rather than
conceptual) definition given to the term "investment securities." The
term is defined to include all forms of "investment paper" in bearer or
registered form commonly dealt with upon security exchanges, or common-
ly recognized as a medium of investment in any area, in which the security
is issued or dealt with." As thus defined, investment securities include bear-
er bonds, a form of debt formerly coming under the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Law, as well as the various types of investment paper issued by
corporations evidencing "ownership," but they do not include "money. '
Unlike ordinary commercial paper, investment securities may be issued
subject to liens running in favor of the issuer where they represent a prop-
erty interest in a corporation rather than a debt. This poses something of
a problem at the outset when attributing "negotiability" to such securities.
Such liens often arise from the corporation-stockholder relationship, by way
of additional security in favor of the corporation for a stockholder obliga-
tion. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act dealt in a single section both with
these liens and with restrictions imposed by the "issuer" on the free trans-
fer of corporate shares. It provided that neither should be valid against
a purchaser "unless the right of such corporation to such lien or the restric-
tion is stated upon the certificate."' However, article 8 deals with the two
kinds of "limitations" in separate sections, apparently stating slightly
different rules. Part 1 provides that an issuer's lien should be valid against
a purchaser only if it be noted conspicuously on the security. The italicized
'A series of uniform and model acts dealing with this general subject have been
approved from time to time, but with indifferent success. They will be discussed
at notes 124 to 129 and the applicable text infra.8UCC § 8-102(1) (a). Some instruments, defined as "securities" under other regu-
latory legislation, may not meet this definition. See UCC § 8-102, comment.9UCC § 8-102, comment.
'"UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 15 provides in the section title: "There shall'be
no lien or restriction unless indicated on certificate." (Hereinafter UNIFORM STOCK
TRANSFER ACT is cited U.S.T.A.) Compare REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 15-
642. (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.)
"By majority ruling, purchaser's actual notice charges him, despite this section.
Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 AtM 118, 121, (1924) ; Doss v. Yingling,
95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801, 804 (1930) ; Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797,
121 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1954), Contras Hopwood v. Topsham, 120 Vt. 97, 132 A.2d
170,173 (1957).
[Vol. 21,
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word was substituted for "set forth" in the original approved draft, to
make clear that the lien does not have to be set forth in full."
Part 1 also contains the one provision in all of article 8 giving to the
rules proscribing abuse of the corporate device a clear and controlling pre-
cedence over the interest of the money market in the principle of "nego-
tiability." Here the doctrine that stock issued in excess of the corpora-
tion's authorized capitalization is void, is adhered to.'  The provisions of
the article validating or requiring the issue or reissue of a security are ex-
pressly limited so that they do not apply to any issue which would result
in an "overissue."" However, if the corporation otherwise would have
a duty to issue or reissue such share certificate, the person entitled thereto
can compel the corporation to supply the share from the open market "if
reasonably available. "' Otherwise the corporation must pay damages meas-
sured by the price "he or the last purchaser for value paid for it with in-
terest from the date of demand."" A considerable difference of opinion
has developed in the various discussions of this section as to what is the
most satisfactory measure of damages in such contingency. ' Granting that
the rule adopted may prejudice the purchaser in some situations, its framers
insist that the rule is the most satisfactory one to govern all cases.'
Part 1 also states expressly a rule of "full negotiability" for all secur-
ities covered.' It further states certain rules of evidence involving con-
trolling presumptions and burdens of proof in actions on securities, to aid
in maintaining the integrity of the negotiability principle. This is done in
much the same language as is found set forth in article 3," regulating other
types of negotiable insrtuments.'
The concluding section in part 1 deals with conflict of laws problems
which may arise in applying this Code to the investment securities field."
However, it must be considered with the general section in the Code stating
"choice of law" rules for the Code generally.' With certain exceptions,
article 1 authorizes the parties to agree on the governing law, chosen from
any state bearing a reasonable relation to the transaction." Failing such
agreement, any forum enacting this Code and having "an appropriate rela-
" ee comment concerning restraints on alienation in the text at notes 45 and 46
infra.
-UCC § 8-104.
"There was some support for the view that "overissue" should not be a defense
against a person otherwise entitled to a security, but that, rather, the issuer should
be compelled to amend its articles therefor. But this view did not prevaiL See
UCC § 8-104, comment 1; Bunn, Article 8-A Law for the Transfer of Investment
Securities, 1952 Wis. L. Rzv. 338, 343.
'UCC § 8-104(1) (a).
IIUCC § 8-104(1) (b).
"72 NEw YoRK LAW REVIsION CoMMISsION, REPORT AND HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 829, 883, 951 (1954). (Hereinafter cited NYLRC, UCC REPoRT.)
See also UCC §.8-104, comment 3.
'UCC § 8-104, comment 3.
"UCC § 8-105(1).
"UCC § 3-307.
1The language is modified only to take into account certain intrinsic differences be-
tween "investment securities" and other types of negotiable paper.
-UCC § 8-106.
"uCC § 1-105.
TUCC § 1-105(1).
1959]
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tion" to the transaction will apply the provisions of the Code.' However,
this same section refers to five articles including article 8 containing pro-
visions specifying the "applicable law" for each article, recognizes them as
controlling for each respective article, and states that any contrary agree-
ment will be effective "only to the extent permitted by the law (including
the conflict of laws rules) so specified.' The relevant section for article 8
selects the "law (including the conflict of laws rules): of the jurisdiction of
organization of the issuer'. to determine "the validity of a security and
the rights and duties of the issuer with respect to registration of transfer,'
though general contract rights arising from a contract for the sale of se-
curities still appear to be governed by the rule governing commercial con-
tracts generally, under article 1. Although this is not the place to explain
in detail the implications of this formulation of the conflicts rule, it reflects
a principle which the present writer has been expounding for quite some
years now, i.e., that the most satisfactory solution for some conflicts ques-
tions, in some fields and for some issues, is to select some one law as con-
trolling the question, wherever general agreement thereon is possible, and
then to apply the whole of that law, including its applicable "choice-of-law"
rule.'
PART 2- ISSUE-ISSUER
For the "principle of negotiability" better to serve modern investment
practices there is a need for growth, flexibility, and adaptability in that
concept, as becomes strikingly apparent in the next three parts.' Although
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act sought to give to "subsequent purchasers"
of stock the protection afforded by "negotiability," as against prior hold-
ers, it did not attempt to modify the rights and duties existing between the
2Ibid. Comment 3 to this section recognizes that the phrase "appropriate relation"
may broaden the forum's "choice of law" rule considerably, leading the forum to
apply its UCC, though it would not so apply its own law in other types of transac-
tions, justifying its application on the grounds of its "comprehensiveness," desire
for uniformity, and the fact that it is a reformulation of the "law merchant" and
of business community practices transcending political boundaries.
2GUCC § 1-105(2).
2 UCC § 8-106.
28Ibid. But see discussion at notes 182 to 188 infra.
'UCC § 1-105(1).
JThis is consistent with what we may call an "organic-institutional approach." See
Briggs, The Jurisdictional--Choice-of-law Relation in Conflicts Rules, 61 HARv. L.
R~v. 1165 (1948) ; Briggs, The Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy
Centered Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 667 (1953) ; Briggs, The Need for the
"Legislative Jurisdictional Principle" in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws, pub-
lished concurrently in 39 MINN. L. REv. 517 (1955) and 4 INT'L. & ComPARATIvE
L.Q. 329 (1955) ; Briggs, Ewcerpts from Utility for Solving the "Renvot," SEL"CTE
READINGs ON CONFLICT or LAws 189 (1956). The following statement made in
1953 is especially relevant to the present issue: "The domicil's governmental in-
terest In the permanent corporate-stockholder relation, in maintaining the power
to regulate and supervise and limit those rights, with a general recognition that
these legal relations must generally be determined by a single law, makes it al-
most as natural to state a jurisdictional rule looking to the cororate domicil, as
it is to look to the situs to control land. The shape of the future points to more
governmental regulation of these matters rather than less, calling for a delimita-
tion of legislative power thereover to minimize conflict. So if that domicil chose
to utilize the law of a third state to determine these rights, certainly it should be
included in any reference from F, foreign court, to the domiciliary law." Briggs,
6 VAND. L. REV. supra, at 683.
'Sherman and Feeney, An ExTamination of the Negotiability Concept of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 305-307.
[Vol. 21,
5
Briggs: Article 8: Investment Securities
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1959
ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES
issuing corporation and the transferee of its stock, measured by constitu-
tional and statutory regulations governing stock issues, even though its
editorial comment states that that act extends full negotiability to certifi-
cates of stock.' Article 8 deals with both questions. As suggested by its
title, "Issue-Issuer," part 2 tries to give effect to the special character of
corporate shares and bonds at the same time that it frames rules of nego-
tiability between the issuer and all subsequent holders of its stock. "Is-
suer" is described generally as any legal person who sells shares in his
property or enterprise or acknowledges a duty to perform an obligation,
represented and evidenced by an appropriate security,' and includes any
guarantor on such instrument to the extent of his obligation." As between
the issuer and all "purchasers" (which includes the original "subscriber"
to the security),' part 2 narrows the concept of "negotiability" in one im-
portant respect, and broadens it in another.
On the one hand, recognizing the common practice of "incorporating"
in securities by reference relevant statutory, charter, and bylaw provisions,
it narrows the protection which negotiability gives to even a purchaser for
value and without notice by charging him with notice of those provisions
to the extent that such "terms" do not conflict with the stated terms of the
security.' However, part 2 does not subject such purchaser, even with no-
tice, to defects affecting "validity." Compliance with the law limiting
issue is the primary responsibility of the issuer.' A purchaser for value
without notice of the particular defect, even though it goes to validity, is
protected if the issue is not unconstitutional.' The defenses of a private
issuer are narrower than those of a government issuer. To be enforceable
against the latter, an issue must substantially comply with legal require-
ments or the issuer must have received value, and a purpose of the issue
must be one for which the issuer can legally borrow.' Generally, lack of
genuiness of a security is a complete defense for the alleged issuer.' Other
issuer's defenses generally are ineffective against a purchaser for value with-
out notice of the particular defense."
On the other hand negotiability is broadened by the rule that the fact
that the security has "matured," in the sense of being either "collectible"
or "salable" or "exchangeable" to the issuer, does not prevent the holder
from being a "bona fide purchaser," as defined by the act. 2 Some types
'5U.S.T.A. § 5, editorial comment.
TUCC § 8-201(1).
14UCC § 8-201(2).
'UCO § 1-201(32) defines "purchase" to include "taking by issue," and UCO §
1-201(33) defines "purchaser" to include any person taking by "purchase."
81UCC § 8-202(1).87Ibid.
'UCC § 8-202(2) (a). Although this section expressly makes even an unconstitu-
tional issue valid in the hands of a subaequent purchaser for value and without
notice, comment 3, thereto, makes it clear that the rights of the original purchaser
under an unconstitutional issue are left to the law of the particular state. Further,
as against the "issuer," to be charged with notice a purchaser must have notice of
the particular defect involved, not merely notice of "adverse claims generally," the
rule which controls between different purchasers. This broadens the protection
against the Issuer given by "negotiability." See note 68 infra and the applicable
text.
OUCC § 8-202(2) (b).40UCC § 8-202(3).
'UCC § 8-202(4).
-UCC § 8-3o2.
1959]
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of securities continue to be negotiable against the issuer for one year after
"maturity" while others retain that quality for two years." Of course, this
varies much from the effect of such "maturity" on ordinary commercial
paper. This is in recognition of the fact that the latter normally will be
"enforced" if not paid when "due," while the many kinds of securities
with "maturity provisions" in them, whether bonds or some form of stock,
continue to be dealt in for a considerable period thereafter. Effect is thus
given to the demands of the market.
Another characteristic of securities not present in other negotiable
paper is that in modern times, at least, the issuer frequently wishes to im-
pose some limitations on the transfer thereof. Free assignability has been
considered as essential to the principle of "negotiability." The Code re-
solves this apparent conflict by providing that "unless noted conspicuously
on the security a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer even though
otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person with actual knowl-
edge of it."" But this exception recognizes and states the prevailing in-
terpretation of section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, that it did
not protect "purchasers with notice."' However, as observed earlier in
dealing separately with "liens," part 1 of this article does not contain this
exception." Though editorial comment does not help here, the long history
of careful consideration given to the drafting of these sections may support
the conclusion that the variation was intentional."
The sections in part 2 providing that even unauthorized signatures
placed on securities by certain classes of persons entrusted by the issuer
with the securities and with authority to sign or prepare them for signing
preliminary to their issue," will create an enforceable instrument in the
hands of a bona fide purchaser, and that, if an incomplete security is wrong-
ly altered, it is enforceable according to its original terms," do not vary
markedly from corresponding sections governing commercial paper.'
Though the basis for liability of the maker is stated primarily in terms
of negligence under the latter sections, and in terms of "inherent authority
of an agent" under the former, the scope of the rights of a good faith holder
seem to be substantially the same under each, and the comments expressly
state that both are framed on the idea that the issuer or maker should stand
the primary loss, both because he is in the best position to guard against
"UCC § 8-203(1) (a) and (b). Comment 1 notes that the effect of "maturity" Is
stated in terms of "issuer's defenses," rather than "negotiability." The fact Is
that one can be a "good faith purchaser" of "matured" investment securities, while
he cannot be a "holder in due course" of matured "commercial paper" under either
the UNIFORM NwOTiABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw or article 3 of the Code.
-UCC § 8-204.
"Supra note 11.
"See text at notes 10, 11, and 12 mpra.
"2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 862, 864, 974 (1954). Since the question of whether actual
potice should so charge was discussed at length by various groups studying this
Code, and since that proviso was added to UCC § 8-204, but not to § 8-103, pre-
sumably the distinction was intentional, but query whether justified.
"UCC § 8-205(a) and (b).
"UCC § 8-206(2). UCC § 8-206(1) also provides that the blanks in a security con-
taining the necessary endorsements may be filled in by anyone, and enforced as
completed by a good faith purchaser.
-UCC §§ 3-403 to -406.
[Vol. 21,
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such wrong-doing, in the first place, and also to protect himself by bonding
his employees and agents.'
To make clear, however, that the "negotiability" concept has not run
so rampant as to overturn all traditional corporate law regulating the rela-
tion of issuer and shareholder, part 2 preserves the traditional right of the
issuer to treat the record owner of shares as the person entitled to exercise
those rights and powers normally incident to ownership, such as receiving
notice and participating in meetings, voting, and receiving dividends.'
Likewise the issuer can charge the owner with all the duties incident to
ownership until formal demand for registering a transfer is made.' Con-
tinuing the change made by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,' registration
becomes similar to the recording of a deed under a registry system, and is
not essential to the completing of title transfer as it was at common law.
The corporation's right to look only to the record owner is required both
by business necessity and by custom and usage.'
The concluding section in part 2 states the scope of the warranties given
by a person "authenticating security" to a bona fide purchaser as limited
to the following: 1. the security is genuine and in proper form; 2. he acts
with capacity and authority; and 3. he reasonably believes it is within the
authorized capitalization of the issuer.' He does not warrant validity of
the issue unless specially agreed.' It is believed that this section states the
current understanding of the prevailing case law as to the effect of such
signature.'
PART 3- PURCHASE
Understandably, we find part 3 on "Purchase" containing the bulk of
those rules implementing the principle of "negotiability." Although a com-
ment to the original Uniform Stock Transfer Act declares that "this sec-
tion [5] gives full negotiability to certificates of stock," it has since been
realized that it is not at all accurate to talk about full negotiability so long
as the defenses traditionally existing in favor of the issuer, and arising out
of the various "irregularities" in the issuing process, continue to operate
with full force against all holders. Consequently, the comment to part 3
states :' "This Article views the concept of negotiability from two aspects:
issuer's defenses and adverse claims ... " (i.e., claims of third persons as
"purchasers").
Although the traditional law of corporations regulating the transfer of
stock ownership always has been influenced by the idea that "record title"
as shown by the corporation's "stock books" should control and limit owner-
ship, that idea has been progressively modified over the years in the direc-
5MUCC § 8-205, comment 1.T UCC § 8-207(1).
-UCC § 8-207(2)..MU.S.T.A. § 3.
' It is important to note that the language of UCC § 8-207(1) is permissive only,
saying that "the issuer may treat the registered owner as the person exclusively
entitled to vote .... (emphasis added), permitting the issuer to recognize the right
of transfer before "presentment"; however, informal notice of transfer is not
enough to impose a duty. See also UCC § 8-207, comments 2 and 3.
"UCC § 8-208(1).5
'UCC § 8-208(2).
"UCC § 8-208, comment 1.
9UCC § 8-301. comment 1.
1959]
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tion of looking to the delivery of a properly assigned or indorsed certificate,
as controlling the transfer of "title" thereto. Gradually it was realized
that although the corporation must be permitted to rely on its own records
to determine whom it should treat as owner, this principle need not limit
title transfer. Earlier statutes went far in this direction, ' and the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act adopted it without qualification.' Article 8 reaffirms
the principle, applied to corporate stock, and extends it to all "investment
securities." So, on delivery of the certificate, the "purchaser" acquires
all the rights which his transferor had authority to convey. ' This is true
even though the certificate lacks a necessary indorsement, because the pur-
chaser can compel such indorsement. ' However, he is a bona fide purchaser
only from the time of indorsement," because such holder is defined as a
"purchaser for value in good faith without notice of any adverse claim who
takes delivery of a security in bearer form or of one in registered form
i#sued to him or indorsed to him or in blank." (Emphasis added.) '  As
such, he acquires the security free of all adverse claims." Conversely, in-
dorsement, whether special or in blank, does not effect a transfer until de-
livery, which means delivery of both documents if the "assignment" is on
a separate document. '
At this point, it may be well to note that to preserve the principle of
"negotiability," as against the issuer, the "purchaser" does not have to be
a strict bona fide purchaser; it is only necessary that he take for value
without notice of the particular defect claimed, ' while to be free of all ad-
verse claims by third persons, he must not have had notice of any adverse
claim. However the issuer has a defense against all parties, when the de-
fect is that the shares are part of an excess issue.
Although on most issues of notice it is for the trier of fact to deter-
mine such notice, part 3 stipulates that either a special indorsement on a
bearer or registered instrument, or a clear statement of ownership in a
third person on the face of a bearer instrument, is notice by operation of
law. ' But the mere fact that an instrument is held by a fiduciary, or for a
third person, is not notice of an adverse claim, though if the purchaser
knows that the fiduciary is applying proceeds to his own use, he is charge-
able with such notice.
The original draft of the Code provided that any purchaser of a
certificate within six months after he had received notice that it was lost
or stolen was charged with notice of adverse claim by operation of law.
Criticism made in the hearings before the New York Law Revision Coin-
' See R.C.M. 1947, § 15-504(2), making the stockholder record conclusive of owner-
ship rights, and also R.C.M. 1947, § 15-603, making a transfer of a certificate con-
clusive against subsequent purchasers and creditors, though recognizing the is-
suer's right to look only to the record owner as the true owner.6 tU.S.T.A. §§ 3 and 5.6 UCC § 8-301(1).
-UCC § 8-307.
"Ibid.6 UCC § 8-302.6 'UCC § 8-301(2).6'UCC § 8-309.
'Compare UCC §§ 8-202(2), (4), -206(1)(b), -208(1), requiring notice of the par-
ticular "defect" as against the issuer, with UCC § 8-302, defining "bona fide pur-
chaser."6 UCC § 8-304(1).
'-UCC § 8-304(2).
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mission was that this limitation would impose too great a burden on bank-
ing and brokerage houses just because of the great volume of shares in-
volved.' The restriction was omitted in the 1957 revision, thus converting
into an ordinary fact issue for the jury the question whether it is a "notice"
forgotten in good faith. If so, it will not be effective notice."
A closely related question on "notice" is the effect "staleness" or
"maturity" has on the relative rights of different purchasers. The section
dealing with that subject, already discussed, stated a special rule with re-
gard to notice of defenses as between a purchaser and the issuer.' The
problem still has to be resolved as between different purchasers, and is
dealt with in part 3. The "maturity" of the security does not automatical-
ly serve as notice of adverse claims between different purchasers any more
than it does of defects giving defenses between the issuer and a purchaser.
However, the" allowable" periods for dealing in securities after "maturity"
are shorter, between different purchasers, than between issuer and pur-
chaser. For the latter it will be recalled that the periods are one year, if
the maturing event calls for the payment of money which is available, and
two years otherwise. " For different purchasers part 3 sets a six month and
a one year period for the two classes respectively." The editorial reason
given for this difference is that "a purchaser who takes a security after
funds or other securities are available for its redemption has more reason
to suspect claims of ownership than issuer's defenses. An owner will nor-
mally turn in his security rather than transfer it at such a time.'" The
same comment also observes that "of itself, a default never constitutes notice
of a4 possible adverse claim. To provide otherwise would not tend to drive
defaulted securities home and would serve only to disrupt current financial
markets where many defaulted securities are actively traded. "
With registered securities traditionally treated as simple contracts,
they naturally were transferred by the same kind of formal assignments as
other "choses-in action," and a formal assignment form commonly ap-
pears on the back of stock certificates. However, these methods of transfer
are inapt for negotiable instruments. So, with its attempt to make corporate
stock generally negotiable, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act simplified the
indorsement required for transfer, utilizing the various kinds of "indorse-
ments" regularly associated with the principle of "negotiability." That
"simplified method" is preserved in this Code." So the simple signature
of an "appropriate" person on the back of the instrument will suffice as
an indorsement.' Such indorsement may be either "special" or in blank,'
-'2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 831, 869, 925, 936 (1954).
"Compare UCC § 8-301 (1) in the 1952 draft of the UCC wuth that in the 1958 of-
ficial text.
"UCC § 8-202.
'UCC § 8-203(1) (a), (b).
75UCC § 8-305. Comment 1 provides if payment is in default, the six months period
is not applicable..7OUCC § 8-305, comment 1.
"Ibid. It is well to remember that "defaulted" securities may be traded indefinitely
on the open market, so long as funds for repayment are not available. The rules
regarding staleness clearly are trying to make formal law correspond ta the "needs
of the inner order," in Ehrlich's phrase.
"U.S.T.A. § 20.
"UCC § 8-308.
-UCC § 8-308(1).
mUCC § 8-308(2).
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and although not specified in the general section on indorsements, appar-
ently also restrictive, as "for collection" or "for surrender." ' The tradi-
tional assignment form still may be useful therefor, because when properly
filled in to a named person, either as an assignment or as a power of at-
torney, it will serve as a "special indorsement. "8' Of course, any of various
persons, in addition to the registered owner, may be an "appropriate per-
son" to indorse. These include all classes of fiduciaries with such "pow-
er," such as agents, trustees, administrators, guardians, survivors of joint
owners, or those possessing special statutory powers." Consistently with
the principle that transfers require two distinct steps, i.e., indorsement and
delivery, the question whether the indorser is an "appropriate person" is
determined as of the time of the indorsement, so his subsequent "inca-
pacity" does not effect the indorsement. '
Although a bearer instrument needs no indorsement, it may be indorsed
restrictively, which, as noted above, may serve as "notice of adverse
claims. ''
Another rather important respect in which the incidents arising from
the negotiability of "investment securities" differ from those of the nego-
tiability of "commercial paper" under article 3 of the Code, is that "an
iAdorsement purporting to be only of part of a security representing units
intended by the issuer to be separately transferable is effective to the ex-
tent of the indorsement,' while partial transfer of an instrument defined
as commercial paper under article 3 is not possible-though apparently it
may operate as a "partial assignment. "'
Two of the more important changes in the law regulating the character
of "investment securities" involve the question of what "warranties" a
transferor thereof gives and, secondly, the exact status the various parties
participating in transactions in the securities markets have to each other
and to the subject matter of the transaction. As to the first question, the
framers of article 8 decided that because of the special character of invest-
ment securities, the social limitations regulating the issue of many securi-
ties contrasted with "commercial paper," and the differing purposes creat-
ing the demand for them in the investment markets, the liabilities of trans-
ferors of securities must be substantially more limited than those of trans-
ferors of "commercial paper" generally. So, although under article 3 an
indorser of commercial paper warrants both to his transferee and subse-
quent holders in good faith that "no defense of any party [which includes
the maker or drawer] is good against him" (emphasis added),8' an in-
dorser of an investment security assumes no obligation that the security
will be honored by the issuer "unless otherwise agreed."' As provided in
article 1 of the Code, the parties may alter the rights normally existing
"UCO § 8-304(1) (a).
'UCC § 8-308, comment 2.
"UCC § 8-308(3). The definition of an "appropriate person," given here, also Is
controlling in UCC § 8-312, concerning what is covered by a "signature guarantee."
"UCC § 8-308(6).MUCC § 8-304(1) (a) and note 82 supra.
"UCC § 8-308(5).
-Cf. UCC § 3-202(3).
UCC § 3-417(2) (d).
90UCC § 8-308(4).
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under it, by agreement,' and this section expressly re-affirms that proposi-
tion with regard to an indorser's warranty of performance by the issuer.
One of the most debatable legal questions relating to indorsements has
to do with just what is covered by a "guarantee of a signature" and a
"guarantee of an indorsement," and whether these two guarantees involve
basically different matters, and if so, in precisely what way they differ.
With the existing law generally imposing very strict duties on the issuer
or its agent, to determine both the validity and rightfulness of transfers
when registration of transfer is demanded, their very common practice is
to require full signature and indorsement guarantees. Not only does the
inquiry necessary to support such warranties become very burdensome,
especially when the record owner holds in a fiduciary capacity, but a re-
cent special study shows considerable disagreement and uncertainty as to
what is included under each.' So part 3 spells out the coverage of each
guarantee. The "signature guarantee" warrants (1) the "genuineness" of
the signature, (2) of an "appropriate person," (3) with full legal capacity
to indorse.' The "indorsement guarantee" includes these three, and also
warrants the rightfulness of the particular transfer, i.e., that it conforms
with all conditions which may exist determining whether such transfer is
"proper.' ' This last warranty may be particularly important when the
"gappropriate person" is transferring in a fiduciary capacity, covered by
a trust instrument or a possible court order, or even under a "power of
attorney" with conditions. Either warranty runs in favor of all subse-
quent "purchasers" taking in reliance thereon.'
Section 8-313 considers the "relationship of the parties in a securities
transaction," and is one of the most interesting in article 8. It deals with
a problem which, on analysis, starkly reveals how inadequate traditional
legal concepts and doctrines may be when a real attempt is made to make
them correspond with the customs and practices of the "market place."
The problem involved is that of adequately dealing with the "stock-
broker's" relationship to the process of buying and selling investment secur-
ities on the open market and in the exchanges." All too often, transactions
on the securities markets have been analyzed as involving a simple sales-
purchase agreement between seller and buyer. Agreeably with this analysis,
any broker or brokers involved are considered simply agents of the respec-
tive parties, with their rights and duties measured accordingly. Even the
I Tniform Stock Transfer Act frames the rights and duties arising reciprocal-
ly from these transactions on that analysis.' The fact is, however, that a
vast and complicated apparatus (i.e., body of practices and procedures)
constituting the institution known as the securities exchanges and markets,
has grown up, which requires a set of rules and concepts to govern its
"UCC § 1-102(3).
'22 NYLRC, UCC REP oRT 839 (1954).9' UCC § 8-312(1). Remember that UCC § 8-308(3) defines who Is "an appropriate
person" under UCC § 8-312(1) (b).
-UCC § 8-312(2).
'-UCC § 8-312(3).
"UCC § 8-303 defines "broker," for this article only, broadly and functionally to
include all persons buying and selling securities for all or part of their time on
behalf of "purchasers."
-U.S.T.A. §§ 1, 4 to 7; Bunn, Article 8-A Law for the Transfer of Investment Se-
curities, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 339, 344.
1959]
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 21 [1959], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/8
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
"inner order" quite different from those traditionally applied. To make
the "law" of this Code correspond functionally with the custom and usage
of the market, part 3 recognizes the common fact that instead of being a
simple purchase-sale transaction generally, securities sales are very apt to
be a multi-stage affair, in which the seller may deliver to broker A, who
has a new certificate issued and delivers to broker B, who has still another
certificate issued to himself or possibly to his purchasing customer." Once
this is recognized as an operative fact, the statement in the comments to
section 8-313 that "the relationship between broker and customer is unique,
partaking of various aspects of an agency, bailment, trust and pledge,"
becomes quite understandable. The problem is to frame rules which are
comprehensive and flexible enough to give full effect to such complex rela-
tionships with their varying practices.
As an ordinary agent, under the traditional analysis, the broker quite
generally was not subject to the incidents of being a "party" to the trans-
action, though he might be guilty of "conversion. ' "IW The architects of
article 8, however, found two quite different primary types of transactions,
and they determined to establish a clear basis for distinguishing between
the two. In the first major class, as described in section 8-313 of the Code,
a delivery to the ultimate "buyer," is found to have been completed by any
of the following four variations in the handling of the security: (1) when
such buyer, or a person designated by him acquires actual possession there-
of; (2) when his broker so acquires a security specially indorsed or issued
in the buyer's name; (3) when his broker confirms the purchase and also
sets aside the specific security and positively identifies the same as be-
longing to buyer; and (4) when an identified security is held by a third
person, who acknowledges that he holds for the buyer-as where such se-
curities are pledged by the broker for the balance due for a purchase on
margin trading.
The second major class includes all securities held for customers by the
broker as part of a "fungible bulk," with a confirmation of purchase and
appropriate book entry. In the first class the buyer is deemed to be the
holder, so as to give a defense to all adverse interests coming to his notice
thereafter. As to this second class, however, the buyer is said not to be
such holder, even though he have a "proportionate property interest" in
the fungible bulk.' A very important policy consideration enters into
the framing of these rules on when "delivery to the purchaser" occurs.
An earlier New York decision' had ruled that a broker could compel his
customer to take securities ordered, even where notice of adverse interests
came to the purchaser before receiving physical delivery, though after the
broker became "custodian" (acting as an agent). This either makes it
impossible for the buyer to avoid being subjected to such adverse interests,
or at the very least requires him to assume the burden of establishing his
"2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 999-1005 (1954) ; Bunn, op. cit. supra note 97, at 344.
NUCC § 8-313, comment 1.
'OSee UCC § 8-313, comment 4.
'Ot The large volume of securities which must be treated as a fungible mass is em-
phasized by the introduction of "clearing house" practices whereby brokerage
houses merely settle on the basis of "balances" due, rather than for specific pur-
chases and sales. See UCC § 8-313, comment 3.
m10 Isham v. Post, 141 N.Y. 100, 35 N.E. 1084 (1894).
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priorities-perhaps to defend a lawsuit. The drafting committee is very
sure that the burden of any resulting lawsuits should be on the broker
rather on the customer, who "hires the broker" and pays him for "clean
securities."' To make it easier to place responsibility on the broker, the
concept of a series of "purchases" without corresponding "sales" in any
multi-step transaction is introduced. Brokers are treated as "purchasers,"
even bona fide purchasers, though the only "sale" is to the ultimate buy-
er.' Though novel sounding at the outset, there may be any number of trans-
fers of "legal title" from fiduciary to fiduciary, with only a single beneficial
ownership being involved. The purchases may be said to involve legal title
transfer, but the "sale" is an attribute or an incident of the beneficial
ownership.' The practical or "functional" purpose of this analysis is
simply to support the attributing of some incidents of "ownership" to the
broker, rejecting pro tanto the incidents of mere agency ordinarily at-
tributed to him. And this is done to place the primary responsibility for
defending lawsuits over ownership on the broker in certain circumstances,
providing him, however, with the protection granted to a bona fide pur-
chaser, if he is otherwise entitled to claim as such.'
The special status of a broker as "purchaser" also is used to determine
when "delivery" of a security is deemed completed when effected through
brokers. In transactions on exchanges or through brokers generally the
seller 'satisfies tle duty to "deliver" by placing "qualifying" securities
in the possession of the selling broker or one designated by him, and the
selling broker completes "delivery" by taking the same action in favor of
the "buying" broker.' But in other sales not using a broker the seller's
duty to deliver is completed only by placing the security, in negotiable form,
'2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 1004 (1954). The New York Stock Exchange provides that
such security should be returned to the broker introducing it Into the market,
seemingly approving a rule imposing liability for such "adverse interests." 2 id.
at 887, 897.
"'2 id. at 999.
"2 id. at 999-1003.
'In comment 3 to UCC § 8-313, the Code's editors attempt to support the rule that
the broker rather than the buyer should have to resist "adverse claims" if there
has not been actual delivery to the buyer and if notice of such claims comes to the
buyer before that delivery, though after "delivery" to the broker. Their argument
is that the buyer could not possibly be a bona fide purchaser In such case, so it
would be unjust to make him accept delivery. However, this rationale is criticized
(correctly, it seems) on the ground that if the broker holds as a bona fide pur-
chaser he can and will convey all of his rights to the buyer, under UCC § 8-301(1),
known as the "shelter provision." 2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 897, 1005 (1954). This
objection is not actually answered by Israels, who justifies requiring the broker to
resist adverse claims on the very practical ground that he is the one in the best
position to take or defend legal action, and that, "I [buyer] am paying him
[broker] my good money to get me clean stuff, and I don't want to be required to
take anything else from him under any conditions whatever." 2 id. at 1004. So,
the basic issue is one of policy, whether these "implications" should be considered
part of the normal security-purchase agreement. The Code answers affirmatively,
and probably correctly, on these policy considerations.
'
t UCC § 8-314(1). This section also provides that the normal rule may be varied by
agreement.
"UCC § 8-314(1). There is a difference of opinion whether a selling broker Is or
should be treated as a "purchaser" under the Code, but in any case this rule on
"completed delivery" so treats him, rather than as a simple agent of the seller.
Cf. 2 NYLRC, UCC REPoRT 999 (1954).
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in the hands of the purchaser, or at his direction.' A sale to a broker for
his own account, not on an exchange, is included under this last rule.m
The general right of an owner to reclaim possession of a security
wrongfully transferred, except as against bona fide purchasers, is con-
tinued ;' and if based on a forged or unauthorized indorsement, even a
bona fide purchaser is subject to a recovery action if he has not yet se-
cured a new security upon registering of transfer.' The rules stated else-
where' 3 protecting such bona fide purchaser in all events control the latter
event. This right of recovery is in addition to a possible damage action for
conversion."'
Further stressing the negotiable character of investment securities, part
3 requires generally that the certificate itself be seized as a condition to
attachment,"' and all available process for the levying on property "not
readily attachable" is made available to creditors.'5 Hence, in spite of an
outstanding order for attachment, the security still may be negotiated
until actual seizure.' This is the rule for negotiable instruments generally,
in contrast to simple contract obligations which are only "garnishable" by
serving the debtor, himself. The exception to this rule, that securities
surrendered to the issuer may be levied on "at the source," is consistent
with the general rule.' This is the orthodox manner for "levying" on
stock. But when in the hands of the issuer, the record title becomes con-
trolling again. And, with the certificate withdrawn from circulation its
"negotiable" quality is suspended, making it similar to a simple contract,
leviable against its ultimate "obligor," the issuer.
Part 3 concludes with a standard statute of frauds provision, alternate-
ly requiring (1) a writing signed by the party to be charged, adequately
describing the subject matter and the terms, or (2) delivery or payment,
or (3) a written confirmation with adequate description, received by the
person chargeable, with no written objection from him within 10 days, or
(4) the party charged admits in judicial proceedings a contract for such
sale.' The editorial comment points out that the third alternative, author-
izing a written confirmation, is particularly significant on the securities
market because a large portion of the total volume of transactions is con-
summated by phone, followed by a confirming statement, generally, on a
-UCC § 8-314(2).
'"Ibid. Incidental to a sale also is the duty to provide the purchaser with
all proof of right to transfer by the seller which is necessary to establish a right
to the registration of such transfer. UCC § 8-316.
"'UCO § 8-315(1).
"3UCC § 8-315(2).
"UCC §§ 8-311, -405.
"4See UCC § 8-318, protecting innocent brokers and other "agents" and bailees from
liability for conversion.
"
3UCO § 8-317(1).
1"UCC § 8-317(2).
u7UCC § 8-317(2), comment 2. The common law rule, illustrated in National Bank
of the Pacific v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 157 Cal. 573, 108 Pac. 676 (1910), that
whichever (levy or transfer) was prior In time prevailed, is thus repudiated.
"833 BANCROFT, CODE PRACTICE AND REMEDIES §§ 2637 to 2639 (1927) ; R.C.M. 1947,§ 93-4307(5). See also R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-4307(4), 93-4308 to -4311, providing
particularly for "attachment" of securities by levying on the corporation. These
sections would be superseded by UCC § 8-317.
"IUCO § 8-317(1).
'UCC § 8-319.
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standard form more than meeting the minimal descriptions and terms re-
quirements.'
PART 4 -REGISTRATION
Although the registration of transfers of investment securities dealt
with in part 4 involves questions which are quite independent of the law
of negotiability, to secure the maximum benefit from extending that prin-
ciple to such securities, it is vitally important that the "registration" pro-
cedure be simplified in every way possible, and that the duties and re-
sponsibilities imposed on the issuer or its agent for guarding against the
registration of "wrongful transfers" be minimized as much as possible,
consistent with the requirements of honesty and "fair dealing" among all
the parties concerned. But the drafting of satisfactory legislation regulat-
ing this matter always has caused special difficulty. That difficulty lies
in one of the important differences between "investment securities' '"
and other "commercial paper," generally, a difference which always has
complicated seriously earlier attempts to extend the principle of "nego-
tiability" to the former. Commercial paper represents "single" obligations
to pay-simple "choses-in-action." In contrast, instruments representing
shareholder interests and composing a large part of investment securities
represent two very divergent interests: 1. proportional ownership in a
business or industry, representing substantial proprietary interests for the
indefinite future, and certainly embodying a large bundle of reciprocal
rights, privileges, powers and immunities between issuer and holder; 2. The
share certificate itself, valued as a "chattel" or "commodity." Of course,
it is the latter only which is made "negotiable." Historically, the issuer's
primary concern has been with the first aspect of "shareholdership"; so
it has thought it quite necessary to keep a formal record, not only of all
initial issues, but also of subsequent transfers thereof. And, of course, to
identify the persons entitled to exercise these proprietary rights, the law
of business organizations generally has both approved and even required
the keeping of such records. The difficulty and complexity involved in
framing fully satisfactory legislation regulating the registration process
which will do violence to neither of the above interests is strikingly demon-
strated by the history of such legislation, including particularly the fore-
runners of part 4 in article 8.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act did not attempt to regulate the reg-
istration of security transfers;' nor did it apply the attributes of nego-
'nUCC § 8-319, comment 2.
'nAs has been said, the definition of "investment securities" used in this act is
"functional" rather than "conceptual," in the sense that it includes all instruments
in that class which serve the "investment needs" of the community. But, in a
larger sense, the whole of article 8 is designed to serve as an "apparatus of func-
tion." It may be instructive to think of the investment market processes and in-
strumentalities organically, in institutionalized form, with the apparatus formal-
ized In article 8 as doing Its best to give expression to a body of already highly
developed norms for its "inner order," though finding it necessary every now and
then to "rectify" some traditional conceptual rules which heretofore have hindered
the smooth and trouble free operation of that institution.
"3The only sections dealing directly and especially with the rights and duties be-
tween the issuer and a purchaser are two: (1) U.S.T.A. § 3 authorizes the issuer
to treat the record holder as the true owner; (2) U.S.T.A. § 17 gives the owner
of a lost or stolen security the remedy of "specific performance" to compel the
issuer by court order to issue a replacement certificate, upon proper proof and
bond.
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tiability to the "issuer-stockholder" relation. However, a uniform act ap-
proved in 1922 by the commissioners, entitled "Uniform Fiduciaries Act,"
and attempting to regulate all forms of transactions transferring interests
to and from fiduciaries, contains a section dealing with fiduciary transfers
of securities'' which is intended to relieve the agency registering such trans-
fer of all duty to check whether such fiduciary may be violating any of
his fiduciary obligations. However, this section has failed to simplify and
facilitate registration, as had been hoped.' Those drafting part 4 of
article 8 undoubtedly gave a great deal of thought to the problem of stat-
ing the controlling rules so as to expedite registration and give relief from
the excessive burden of documentation which continued to be required under
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Notwithstanding this, part 4, as approved
for adoption in 1952, probably was justly criticized on the ground that it
largely failed in this objective. The heart of this part of the article is
found in section 8-402, permitting the issuer to require assurances of the
indorsing signatures' effectiveness, and section 8-403, delimiting the duty
to inquire into the "rightfulness of the transfer." Of the former, one
critic has said :'
Apparently the purpose of see. 8-402 was to simplify the transfer
requirements, but it would appear that all it has done is to shift
the responsibility from the transfer agent to the signature guar-
antor. So long as the signature guarantor is compelled to warrant
the capacity and the authority of the fiduciary the guarantor will
have to require the same documents now required by the transfer
agents.
Probably a more substantial criticism of section 8-403 in its original form
is put thus :'2
The apparent purpose of the Code, to accelerate the transfer of
securities, is achieved only in a limited number of situations and
could have been best carried out by providing the transfer agent
with a clear procedure to follow when faced with an adverse claim.
Instead of providing such a procedure, which would have relieved
a transfer agent of the unwarranted investigatory burden imposed
upon it, the Code merely attempts to limit its liability....
In the 1957 revision the demand for a "clear procedure to follow when faced
'UNIFORM FIDUCIAmES AcT § 3. Still another attempt to deal with this problem is
found in the MoneT. FIDUcIARIEs SECURITiEs TRANSFER AcT, sponsored by a special
committee of the American Bar Association and the Illinois Bar Association. See
discussion in 1 CHRisTY, TRANSFER OF STocx § 225b, at p. 17:10 (3d ed. 1958). A
number of states adopted this act in 1957, but upon adoption of the UCC by those
states it will be superseded.
oIronically, the Montana legislature enacted § 3 of the UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES ACT
as a self-contained, independent piece of legislation in 1959, although it had long
since been shown that it largely failed in its original purpose to simplify registra-
tion of transfers by fiduciaries and to lessen substantially the supporting docu-
mentation required by the issuer. Laws of Montana 1959, ch. 136, at 245.
"*2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 872 (1954). Israels seems to answer this criticism in 2
id. at 998.
"'Note, Duties and Liabilities of the Stock Transfer Agent Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 103 U. PA. .L, R.v, 209, 237 (1954).
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with an adverse claim" was amply provided for,' at this point only tardi-
ly recognizing the necessity for a genuinely "functional" treatment in its
regulations.
Concurrently with the studies of article 8, itself, going on continuously
by those sponsoring the Code, and possibly based on the informed con-
clusion that section 3 of the original Uniform Fiduciaries Act had proved
altogether inadequate,' and because the "where and when" of the Code's
adoption as a whole was very uncertain, influential representatives of the
investment markets pushed to completion and approval in 1958 an inde-
pendent uniform act, entitled "Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduci-
ary Security Transfers." This act deals in great detail with the very
limited and single subject of the regulation of the registration of transfers
of investment securities by fiduciaries, amplifying on section 3 of the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Although article 8 had been extensively revised
in 1957, along with the entire Code, to avoid the charge that the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws recommended inconsistent measures to
govern a single subject, article 8 was further revised in 1958 to achieve
complete agreement with the act on "simplification." The following dis-
cussion is based on the 1958 revision, which surely goes far in achieving
the objectives sought.
Part 4 imposes on the issuer a general duty to register the transfers
of all securities in registered form upon presentment and demand, subject,
however, to the provisos that (1) they are properly indorsed (the issuer
also may require assurances of the genuiness and effectiveness of the in-
dorsements) ;' (2) there is no notice of adverse claim, or the issuer has
made the investigation required ;' (3) the transfer is in fact "rightful or
is to a bona fide purchaser."' On refusal to register, if right exists, the
issuer may become liable both for specific performance and for damages.'
As mentioned above, determined to protect themselves against possible
liability, issuers and their agents have developed a firmly entrenched prac-
tice and procedure requiring a great amount of "proof" as to the legality
and rightfulness of transfers. Though especially acute where the trans-
feror is a fiduciary, a penetrating analysis of market practices in a mem-
orandum presented in the New York hearings on the Code"' shows that the
practice is almost as common in other kinds of transaction. The mem-
orandum approves the intention of article 8 to limit such "clogs" on all
'"Compare the 1952 and 1957 versions of UCC § 8-403 as set forth in 1956 REcom-
MENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COnE 247-249.
The editors observe: "The section is completely revised .... Subsection (2),
modelled on the New York statute dealing with adverse claims to bank deposits,
provides a procedure which in a large majority of cases should be effective to pro-
tect the rights of all interested parties and relieve the issuer of further responsi-
bility." Id. at 249.
'Israels, Article 8-Investment Securities, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 249, 262
(1951) ; 2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 848-852 (1954) ; Bunn, Article 8-A Law for the
Transfer of Investment Securities, 1952 WIS. L. REv. 339, 346 n.35.
"'UCC § 8-402(1).
'UCC § 8-401 (1).
UCC . 8-401(1) (e). This "condition" makes it clear that, even though other con-
ditions for imposing the duty to register exist, the duty does not arise unless the
transfer was in fact rightful-wrongfulness of transfer always will be a defense,
except against a bona fide purchaser.
-
t UCC § 8-401(2).0'2 NYLRC, UCC REPORT 839-841 (1954).
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transfers generally. So, part 4 both limits the issuer's duty to investigate
adverse claims, and stipulates the "assurances" that indorsements are ef-
fective which it may require,' in the light of its newly limited liabilities
for "improper" registration. As to the latter, it always may require
(1) a guarantee of signature,' by a person reasonably believed to be re-
sponsible, (2) assurance of authority of an indorsing agent, (3) an ap-
propriate certificate of appointment or incumbency of such fiduciary or
fiduciaries, and (4) if there are several fiduciaries, assurance that all have
signed who are required to do so.'
Implementing the expressed policy to discourage excessive documenta-
tion, although permitting additional reasonable assurances, part 4 penalizes
the issuer for demanding documentation for purposes other than to estab-
lish the effectiveness of the indorsements by' charging it with notice of any-
thing affecting the transfer contained in the instruments so required.'
Furthermore, frequently there will be no reason for demanding the assur-
ances expressly authorized. For example, though the issuer can require
evidence of the incumbency of an indorsing trustee, the next section ex-
pressly authorizes the issuer to accept the signature of a registered fiduci-
ary at its face value, until it receives written notice of the revocation of
that fiduciary's power over the particular security.' This rule imple-
ments the Code's policy of limiting the issuer's duty to inquire about ad-
verse claims.
The duty to inquire into adverse claims also is limited generally by
the condition that either the issuer receive a written notice thereof in time
to permit it to delay the registration, or it be charged with notice from a
controlling instrument which it has elected to require.' Furthermore, the
notification must identify the claimant, the registered owner, and the
issue of which the security is a part, and give the claimant's mailing ad-
dress." Unless the written notice meets these formal requirements it is
no legal notice at all.' If not charged in one of the two ways just given
the issuer has no duty at all to inqure.'" In particular, it is not so charged
by the fact that the registered holder is a fiduciary, as stated above;'
neither is it bound to check whether the transfer is "rightful" under any
instrument limiting the fiduciary 's authority,' nor to examine the law of
the state controlling the fiduciary relationship to determine whether it has
been complied with.'"
Two sections of part 4 reveal how directly the granting of full nego-
tiability to investment securities bears on the consequences of "register-
ing the transfer," and in doing so how it enlarges those consequences be-
-UCC §§ 8402, -403.
'wUCC § 8-312 describes a "guarantee of signature" and what it covers.
'UCO § 8-402(1). UCC § 8-402(3) also describes "appropriate evidence of ap-
pointment or incumbency," for UCC § 8-402(1).
-UCC § 8402(4).
'UCC § 8-403(3) (a).
'UCC § 8-403 (1).
"UCC § 8-403(1) (a).
'"Ibid.
""UCC §§ 8-403(1) (a), (b), -403(3).
"UCC § 8-403(3) (a).
'-UCC § 8-403(3) (b),
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yond all traditional principles of negotiability." These two sections, first,
measure the limits of the liability of the issuer for a "wrongful" transfer,
and secondly, provide that in certain circumstances the issuer can be com-
pelled to make two securities grow, where only one has grown theretofore,
solely because of the enlarged scope given to the negotiable principle. While
in the past it has been thought impracticable, if not impossible, to give as
broad a scope to the negotiability of securities as to other forms of com-
mercial instruments, we now discover that it is appropriate and desirable
to give it a broader scope because of the peculiar nature of the instruments
involved.
The first of these sections affirms the basic policy of the article against
any liability of the issuer for any loss sustained by any person as a result
of the registration of a security transfer, provided only that it was "ap-
propriately indorsed ""' as required in part 3, and the issuer had no further
duty to inquire into adverse claims, as limited by part 4.' This general
exoneration is then followed by a statement affirmatively imposing the
duty on the issuer to issue a "like security" upon demand, where it has
registered a transfer to a person not entitled to it,' unless it is entitled to
the above exoneration' M or the true owner has failed to notify the issuer of
loss of the security within a reasonable time thereafter' or such delivery
would result in an over-issue.'" Under the first two contingencies men-
tioned the issuer has no liability. Under the last one the issuer's liability
is gov.¢rned by section 8-104.' Although neither section expressly states
that receipt of a new certificate is the only relief available to the person
suffering a loss from an improper registration of a security transfer if no
over-issue results, editorial comment indicates that it is the intention of
these two sections to eliminate the option which the owner generally has
under common law rulings to demand another security or damages, though
language in the first paragraph of section 8-405 might be interpreted as
suggesting an optional remedy in some cases.'0
After denying any liability under the preceding section to an owner
who fails to notify the issuer that his security has disappeared,' and also
any claim of that owner to a new security,' section 8-405 continues by in-
corporating into the Code the general practice of issuing a new security
1"UCC §§ 8-404, -40.
"'UCC §§8m (1), (3).
"-UCC § 8-404(1).IwUCC § 8-404(2).
""UCC § 8-404(2) (a).
m.UCO §§ 8-404(2) (b), -405(1).
'4UCC §8-404(2) (c).
1"'It will be recalled that UCC § 8-104 provides for remedies in cases where a fur-
ther issue, normally required, would result in "overissue." The issuer must then
supply from the market if reasonably available. If not, then he pays the pur-
chaser's cost plus interest running from demand.
155UCC § 8-404, comment 2. Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 149 N.W.
754 (1914), approves the common law rule. An early section in the original ap-
proved draft stated that editorial comment should be taken as a guide in inter-
preting the Code, but that in the case of conflict the language of the Code sections
should control. UCC § 1-102(3) (f) (1952). Actually, in the hearings before the
New York Law Revision Commission witnesses frequently referred to asserted
conflicts. 2 NYLRC, UCC REIoar 967, 973-974 (1954). Although UCC § 1-102
(3) (f) was omitted in the 1958 revision, the editorial comments remain persuasive.
"
4UCC § 8-405(1).IBIb"d.
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to replace lost, destroyed, or stolen ones, upon demand with a "sufficient
bond."' The issuers' common practice of issuing a new certificate with-
out requiring litigation, on posting of a bond, thus is made legally manda-
tory, provided the owner so requests before the issuer has notice of pur-
chase by a bona fide purchaser.' Then subdivision 3 of this section in-
troduces the most novel feature of the entire article. It provides further
that if a bona fide purchaser later requests the registration of the transfer
of the original security, the issuer must likewise register that security, un-
less that would result in an over-issue," ® in which case the party's rights
are again governed by section 8-104, authorizing damages in such case.
Standing alone, this does not yet result in the "growing of two securities
where only one is supposed to grow," because the issuer normally has two
remedies, if needed, against the original owner; he not only can recover
the replacement security issued that owner, but likewise he can recover on
any rights arising under the indemnity bond. However, if the replacement
security has passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, the issuer no
longer can recover it,' and must thereafter treat both holders as owners
of shares for all purposes, if no over-issue results,' solely because of the
controlling effect given the principle of "negotiability."
However, a rule of law requiring the issuer to issue "duplicate" secur-
ities for the one original issue may seem to violate other desirable policies
governing the financing and operation of corporate issuers generally, which
require them to issue stock only for a stipulated consideration, and pro-
hibit them from making "gifts or donations" or otherwise "watering"
their stock.' Moreover, it may be objected to on the assumption that there
are the same reasons against this practice as there are against requiring
the maker of a promissory note to issue a second note merely because the
first one was stolen from the holder. But the analogy is very misleading
A dual issue of securities is permissible only because of one of the funda-
mental differences between investment securities and commercial paper.
The latter is supported by a single, simple chose-in-action, which will not
support multiple "issues" of notes. In contrast, the share certificate repre-
sents a designated number of share units of "ownership," which not only
are fungible, but are identical with every other unit of the same class and
issue; so additional share units may be "charged" against the second cer-
tificate, so long as the supply is not exhausted, even though corporate secur-
ities generally continue to be subject to constitutional and/or statutory
duties on the corporation to receive consideration therefor as a condition
-UCC § 8-405(2). UCC § 8-403(2) also provides that upon notification of an "ad-
verse claim" the issuer discharges his duty to inquire by notifying the claimant
that he has thirty days either to secure a proper court order compelling registration.
or to post an indemnity bond "sufficient in the issuer's judgment."
'UCC § 8-405(2) (a).
UCC § 8-405(3).
"'Ibid.
"OUCC § 8-405, comment 3, considers the question which holder should be required
to surrender if overissue does result. It interprets this section as relegating the
purchaser of the original security to an action for damages. Otherwise, if both
certificates are held by bona fide purchasers, both remain outstanding.
'Montana has an explicit constitutional provision so regulating. MONT. CONST. art.
XV, § 10. As will be recalled, some sentiment developed while drafting progressed
for the view that, even if an additional Issue would result in an "overissue," the
issuer still should be required to so issue, with a duty imposed to increase its
authorized capitalization by amendment. This view did not prevail, however.
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to their issue, and not to overissue. The prohibition against "overissue"
stipulated by section 8-104 prevents violation of the last named duty. Fur-
ther, the requirement of "consideration" for any "issue" is cared for by
the assumption that the issuer will be able to receive full compensation for
the second outstanding security by means of the indemnity bond which the
corporation should require.'
The last statement suggests a question, however, which has been raised
concerning what should be deemed a "sufficient indemnity bond" under
section 8-405.' Without exhausting the subject, it may be suggested that
the least that should be required under the bond is the amount for which
the issuer could be required to ask as the "issuing" price for such security,
plus any incidental costs arising from the transaction which may accrue
against the issuer and/or its transfer agent.
A more serious problem of construction, arising both from a latent
ambiguity in the term "original security" and from uncertainty of what
classes of "lost or stolen securities" a subsequent holder may be a bona
fide purchaser, is found in the language used in section 8-405(3). It is
stated there that "if, after the issue of the new security, a bona fide pur-
chaser of the original security presents it for registration of transfer, the
issuer must register the transfer unless registration would result in over-
issue." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the question was raised in hear-
ings whether the holder of a stolen security with a forged indorsement
could ever be such bona fide purchaser "of the original security,"' there
does not appear to be any satisfactory editorial commentary on it. An ad-
viser for article 8 points out that very often the holder presenting a se-
curity for registration will not be holding the certificate with the forged
indorsement on it, even though it may be based on an unindorsed stolen
certificate. This will be true generally if purchased on an exchange, be-
cause a new certificate normally will have been issued, warranted by the
issuer itself. Nevertheless, even though it be possible for such holder to be
a bona fide purchaser in all other cases, in any instance in which the holder
presents the original stolen certificate, with a forged indorsement, it would
seem that he could not claim as a bona fide purchaser under sections 8-302
and 8-308(1) which exclude a forgery as an "indorsement." On this con-
struction the term "original security" cannot ever mean the "original
certificate" unless it is indorsed before its theft.
Part 4 concludes with the requirement that transfer agents of all kinds
exercise "good faith and due diligence" on behalf of the issuer, and sub-
jects such agent to the same obligations, rights, and privileges with re-
gard to the holder or owner of securities as has the "issuer," thus impos-
ing substantially greater duties and rights on him than would ordinary
agency law.' At thp same time, as under ordinary agency rules, notice to
'UCC § 8-405(2) (b) and comment 3.
' See 2 NYLRC, UCC REPO.T 857 (1954), where the question is raised whether the
indemnity bond called for should be deemed for the benefit of the issuer or of the
transfer agent. It would seem clear that "to be sufficient" the bond required
should be enough to indemnify all parties fully who may suffer injury for having
to comply with the security owner's demand for a new certificate.
'"Bunn, Article 8-A Law for the Transfer of InViestment Securities, 1952 Wis. L.
Rv. 339, 344; 3 NYLRC, UCC REPoRT 1996 (1955).
'w'UCC § 8-406(1).
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such agent is deemed notice to the issuer, with respect to matters pertaining
to that agent's authority.'
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
The foregoing analysis of article 8 has indicated a great many of the
changes which the framers of that article intended to make in existing law
generally. For the most part, the adoption of article 8 in Montana would
effect those same changes here. Space limitations preclude an exhaustive
examination of all possible changes, statutory and otherwise, which might
result from its adoption. However, the most obvious changes, calling for
the repeal or amendment of certain existing statutes, may be considered
briefly. Upon the Code's adoption,' Montana's laws incorporating the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
should be formally repealed, as should Laws of Montana, 1959, ch. 136, deal-
ing with the registration of security transfers by fiduciaries. In addition,
R.C.M. 1947, sections 15-603 (providing for transfer of shares by "effective
delivery" of the certificate) and 15-605 (authorizing issuer to require cer-
tain "guarantees" before transfer) should be repealed as superseded, and
the statutes relating to "assessible" shares (sections 15-701 through 15-721)
should be re-examined in the light of Code sections 8-103 (restricting is-
suers' liens) and 8-202 (authorizing the incorporation by reference of
statutory regulations and restrictions). However, this last problem already
exists in part under R.C.M. 1947, section 15-642, similarly restricting is-
suers' liens.1' Further, R.C.M. 1947, sections 93-4307(4), and 93-4308
through 93-4311, providing for the attachment of corporate shares, must be
examined in the light of Code section 8-317, requiring seizure of the cer-
tificates themselves for that purpose.
Article 3 of the Code is drafted as a complete substitute for the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law.' Although negotiable bonds were
covered by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, they are expressly
covered by article 8 in the definition of investment securities,' and ex-
pressly excluded from article 3 of the Code.'
Of course, the principal legislation which is supplanted by article 8
is the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,' even though the provisions thereof
-UCC § 8-406(2).
".It is here assumed that article 8 would be approved as part of the Code or not at
all. Separate adoption would require further drafting, because of the general
provisions in other articles applying to article 8, and because of the interrelation-
ship between it and article 3, Commercial Paper. Recognizing the practical im-
possibility of discovering in one study, however intensive, all the relevant state
law which may be affected by the adoption of the Code, the Connecticut Commis-
sion, in addition to recommending its adoption, also recommends the appointment
of a special commission to carry on a continuous study of the interrelationship be-
tween the Code and other parts of the Connecticut Code. CoN. TFmP. COMM.,
STUDY AND REPORT 5 (1959).
'"The legislature should seriously consider whether R.C.M. 1947, §§ 15-608 to -614,
authorizing the issuing of "bearer certificates of stock" in mining corporations
should be continued. Assuming they once served a useful purpose in facilitating
the financing of mining ventures, query whether, with all stock fully negotiable,
their special characteristics are needed.
'UCC § 3-101, comment.
"'1CC § 8-102(1) (b).
"'1UCC § 3-103 (1).
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 15-628 to -651.
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are preserved in large part in article 8. The changes in the existing law
under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act which the sponsors of the Code in-
tend to make in it by the enactment of article 8 have been indicated above.
However, a few Montana decisions adjudicating that act remain to be con-
sidered. A leading Montana case on what is required to constitute an "ef-
fective delivery" under the act" would not be changed by the adoption of
article 8 since the definition of "delivery" under the former is almost ex-
actly that found in the controlling definition of the term under the Code.'
On the other hand, a Montana federal court decision,"' concurred in by a
leading decision from another state, ' would be changed by the adoption of
article 8, under section 8-207.Y It held that in spite of R.C.M. 1947, section
15-630, authorizing the issuer to treat the record owner as the true owner for
determining rights under the share contract, if the issuer has actual knowl-
edge of equitable rights in a third person, including the right to receive divi-
dends as a pledgee of the stock, the issuer has a duty to recognize that right.
At the same time, the law holding the record owner subject to certain liabili-
ties is left unchanged.' ° Also, R.C.M. 1947, section 15-504, providing for the
closing of the stock record books prior to an election, is left unaffected.'
The one section in the Montana Code ' which substantially changed the
wording of the comparable section in the original Uniform Stock Transfer
Act' would itself be materially changed, with much improvement therein.
Originally, the last substantive section in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
limitea the application of that act to securities issued after the act's adop-
tion. Although many states changed this rule to apply the act to both sub-
sequent and prior issues of all securities' otherwise subject to the act, Mon-
tana retained that portion of the section. However, although the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act had no section formally providing a choice-of-law rule
for the act, Montana saw fit to include one in R.C.M. 1947, section 15-649,
stating that the act also should be applicable to all "transfers made in this
state, whether of certificates for shares of domestic or foreign corporations."
In so doing the statute treated the sale as the controlling contract for choice-
of-law purposes, and Montana placed itself practically in a minority of
one in this regard. In contrast, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act quite gen-
erally is interpreted as giving effect to the same choice-of-law principle as
is found in section 8-106 of the Code. The law of the corporate domicile
is held to govern share negotiability, so wherever a certificate transfer oc-
curs, it would be governed by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act if that act
" R.C.M. 1947, §§ 15-628, -649; Lyons v. Freshman, 124 Mont 485, 226 P.2d 775
(1951), ruling that a share certificate with separate assignment found in a joint
deposit box had not been "delivered" by a wife to her husband at their death.
"
6R.C.M. 1947, § 15-649, and UCC § 1-201(14).
'Homestake Oil Co. v. Rigler, 39 F.2d 40, 41 (9th Cir. 1930).
...Morrison v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 189 Miss. 212, 196 So. 247 (1940).
"'UCC § 8-207, comment 1.
-UCC § 8-207(2).
UCC § 8-207, comment 5.
ImR.C.M. 1947, § 15-650.
-U.S.T.A. § 23.
8 The California statute is illustrative, providing: "This article applies to certificates
for shares, whether issued before or after the taking effect of this article .
See 6 U.L.A., STOCK TUAsFm, 1958 Pocket Part 118.
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were adopted by the corporate domicile.' The 1952 version of the Code
adopted a basis for selecting the controlling law similar to Montana's, but
it was precisely that rationale of "territoriality of the transaction" which
was most vigorously attacked in the hearings before the New York Commis-
sion.' Those criticisms led to the inclusion of section 8-106, which deals
with the matter.
Unfortunately, however, though the rationale adopted and the crafts-
manship shown in its drafting are a great improvement over the 1952
version, section 8-106 of the Code, correlated with section 1-105, still is no
model of drafting. It seems reasonably clear, as stated above, that while
the "validity" of the security and the "issuer's obligations" as the regis-
trar of security transfers are governed by the issuer's domicile under sec-
tion 8-106, the law governing the "sales" contract itself is subject to the
agreement of the parties under section 1-105. But, whether the negoti-
ability of a security should be governed by the one section or the other is
not altogether clear. The question is, are the elements of "negotiability"
to be treated as essential characteristics of the share certificate itself, is-
sued according to and subject to the law controlling the issue generally, or
are they to be treated as incident to the "sale "--the transfer as a transac-
tion! The provisions of section 1-105, found in the 1952 version of the
Code, which were rejected in the 1957-58 revisions, were based on the latter
premise. Furthermore, the nearly uniform interpretation given the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act, that it is the issuer's domicile which controls
"negotiability," would tend to support the conclusion that the issuer's
domicile governs the question of what rules regulate the transfer of title
under the wording of section 8-106, clearly approving that general principle.
At least one state legislative commission has so interpreted that section.
The Legislative Commission for Kentucky assumes that the issuer's domicile
continues to regulate both the questions of "title and transfer," leaving
the rule under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act unchanged in this respect.'
Moreover, the same practical and functional reasons dictate the selection
of a single controlling law for any given security to determine the require-
ments for its" transfer of title," as well as for the matters dealt with in sec-
tion 8-106.
Nevertheless, there remains a latent ambiguity in its language on this
point, since it expressly so provides only with respect to "validity of a se-
curity and the rights and duties of the issuer with respect to registration
of transfer." Of the three principal aspects involved in the subject mat-
ter of article 8 (i.e., 1. the relation of the issuer to the purchaser; 2. the
requirements for effective transfer of title itself, i.e., negotiability; and
3. the issuer's status as the registrar of those transfers), section 8-106
formally considers only the first and the third. Since these various phases
of the problem generally are treated distributively, distinctively, and in-
'RFsTATEMENT, CONFLIcT OF LAws § 53, comment d, provides: "[S]hares created
in a State in which such an Act [U.S.T.A.] is in force may be transferred by de-
livery of the certificate as provided by the Act even though such delivery takes
place in another state where such Act is not in force." See Annot., 131 A.L.R.
192 (1941).
'NYLRC, UCC REPORT 33-35 (1956).
'KENTUCKY LmisLATuRE RES-ARCuH CoMMISSION, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CONE--
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON EXISTING KENTucxY LAW 301 (1957).
[Vol. 21,
25
Briggs: Article 8: Investment Securities
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1959
ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES
dependently in the Code otherwise, it would seem desirable to continue to
so treat them for "choice of law" purposes, expressly stating the "gov-
erning law" for each phase-especially so for negotiability, because that
concept is most ambiguous with respect to the question whether it should
be assimilated "to the law of the transaction" or "to the law of property."
It must be admitted also that the only section in the Code dealing with the
question to what "things" the Code applies, which provides that "it ap-
plies to transactions entered into and events occurring after" the act goes
into operation,' does not particularly strengthen the construction favored
above, since it talks only in terms of "transactions" and "events." Neither
term appears to be defined anywhere in the Code.
At least one group of decisions, based on common law principles, seems
to be unaffected by article 8. These cases involve the question of what
remedies a subsequent purchaser has against the issuer for wrongful re-
fusal to register the transfer to him.' They establish that in Montana such
purchaser has an election to sue either in "trover" as for conversion, or
to compel the issuer to register. These optional remedies apparently would
continue to be available under the Code, which does not propose to change
existing law on this matter.'
CONCLUSION
Although there has been general approval of article 8 as revised in
1957 and 1958, it has not been quite unanimous. One early critic has per-
sisted in his objections to portions of article 8. Mr. Francis T. Christy
has wielded such influence on the stock brokerage business over many years
through his famous work, entitled The Transfer of Stock, that some of his
criticisms, found in his latest edition,' call for direct comment. Though
his introductory discussion of part 4 of article 8 easily leads the reader to
understand that his critique is directed at the 1958 revision,' the fact is
that most of it was made against the 1952 act and as such may have had
some merit. But, in nearly every instance, the difficulties as charged have
been corrected, so that those criticisms have no merit whatever against the
1958 act. For example, he quotes a serious criticism made of the 1952
act, that it had failed to "provide the transfer agent with a clear procedure
'UCC § 10-101.
'Fitzpatrick v. O'Neill, 43 Mont. 552, 118 Pac. 273 (1911), rules that the purchaser
is entitled to sue the corporate officers in equity to compel recording of the trans-
fer and the issuance of a new certificate. Gillies v. Robert E. Lee Mining Co., 78
Mont. 402, 254 Pac. 422 (1927), holds that wrongful refusal to transfer by a cor-
poration amounts to a conversion of the stock sufficient to support an action for
its value. Although not noted by the Montana court, this latter rule should be
subject to the limits on the power of the corporation to purchase its own stock
under R.C.M. 1947, § 15-801(9).
' These optional remedies for "refusal to register," must not be confused with those
given the "record" owner for a "wrongful registration," under the common law,
whereby he could either demand a new security or sue for damages. Under UCC
J 8-404, as interpreted by comment 2, the record owner is limited to a new secur-
ity, except when one is not available. In that case only is he entitled to damages
under 8-104, thus extinguishing this general common law option.
'
mCHRISTY, TRANSFER OF STOCK (3d ed. 1958).
"11 CHRISTY, TRANSFER OF STOcK § 225a (3d ed. 1958).
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to follow when faced with an adverse claim,"'" as though it still were a
justified criticism of the 1958 revision, when actually the defect has been
completely cured. In another paragraph' he severely criticises section
8-403(2), as it appears in the 1952 act, for proposing to charge the issuer
with a duty to make inquiry in any case in which it has notice that a
fiduciary transfer is to the fiduciary, or the proceeds placed in his in-
dividual account. Though he does not note it, the criticized language is
omitted completely in the 1958 revision.
A criticism which he makes of section 8-405(2), however, cannot be
explained in this way, because it remains unchanged in substance in both
drafts. Ile objects to its requirement that the issuer register the transfer
of a lost certificate on demand of a bona fide purchaser, even though a
replacement certificate is already outstanding, so that if the latter is now
in the hands of another bona fide purchaser the issuer must recognize both.
His comment on this is "this is not only unsound in theory, but unrealistic
in practice."' Though he says nothing to explain this dictum, it would
appear that Christy is unwilling to admit that section 8-405 works out a
reasonably acceptable "resolution" or compromise of the very divergent
interests represented in the security markets, on the one hand, and the
responsible use of the corporate device for cumulating capital, on the other.
There is a plausible and rational basis for explaining the validation of both
certificates in the interest of "negotiability," as given above.
If both intensive and extensive study and criticism of a piece of leg-
islation ever justifies careful consideration by the legislature, this Code
more than qualifies in that respect. Almost certainly there has not been a
uniform act yet submitted to the state legislatures which was subjected to
more critical consideration and analysis than was this act, both before and
after its initial approval by the Code Commissioners and the American
Law Institute. And even though the hearings held by New York's Law
Revision Commission brought out much valid criticism of provisions, con-
sidered in detail, there was little criticism in terms of the overall theory,
objectives, and organization of the Code.' The defects pointed out merely
attest to the extreme difficulty inherent in any large piece of legislative
drafting, and to the infinitely greater difficulty found in any such work
which attempts a genuinely functional (institutional) treatment, rather
than one guided by the ideal of "logical symmetry." Certainly no other
proposed statute has ever had the benefit of the additional thousands of
man hours going into the continued intensive study following its proposal
that this act has had. Those studies resulted in the greatly improved re-
visions of 1957-58. Furthermore, since the 1957 revision particularly, those
state legislative committees who have made a report on the Code quite
generally strongly recommend adoption.
'031 id., § 225a, at p. 17:9, quoting from Note, Dutie8 and Idabilities of the Stock
Transer Agent Unden the Uniform Commercial Gode, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 209, 237
(1954). This same Note is quoted supra. note 127 as a valid criticism of the 1952
draft of the Code.
'"1 CHRiSTY, T NSFar op STOcx § 225a, at p. 17:9 (3d ed. 1958).
"'1 id., § 272, at p. 23:3.
'"NYLRC, UCC REPO T 19-32 (1956).
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